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This thesis provides a logical design view of the
session services control layer of a distributed network to
be used in tne SPLICE (Stock Point Logistics Integrated
Communication Environment) project. It examines tne
functional requirements of session services, the data
necessary to provide that functionality, and the interfaces
required. These areas typically focus on the SPLICE
application specifically, but apply to a generic session
services as well.
The recommendations that are offered relate
specifically to the SPLICE application and address the
prospect of placing a fault tolerant capability in session
services for SPLICE. Other recommendations are appropriate
only to the SPLICE environment.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Navy stock points and inventory control points (ICPs)
are currently in a situation which suggests tnat tney are
outgrowing their current data processing capabilities. The
current hardware suite consists of medium sized Burroughs B-
3500/3700/4700/4800 Systems and is becoming saturated by a
seemingly endless demand for more support. Each year, at an
annual users' conference, the list of "things to do" grows
longer. Eacn stock point is autonomous witn respect to how
it implements data processing support, as long as it
accommodates the Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
requirements. As a result, various mini and micro computers
at these facilities have used locally-provided code instead
of the standard code provided by the Fleet Material Support
Office (FMSO) for the FMSO-maintained systems. FMSO has a
charter to provide system software and application software
for the existing data processing systems used at stock
points. This system is called the Uniform Automated Data
Processing System - Stock Points (UADPS-SP)
.
Long range plans to overcome the current situation
include the purchase of new hardware for the stock points
and ICPs. This effort nas resulted in a contract with Tandem
Computer, Inc. to provide necessary hardware. The design
framework in which this hardware is to be utilized is a
distributed Local Area Network (LAN) architecture. It has




SPLICE is designed to augment the existing data
processing environment at stock points. UADPS-SP, which runs
on the Burroughs Systems mentioned above, is only one of the
automated systems at most stock points. There is the
Integrated Disbursement and Accounting (IDA) System which is
operating on the Interdata 1/32, the Automated Procurement
and Data Entry (APADE) System, and the Trident Logistics
Data System (Trident LDS). Each has its own data elements,
files, programs, transactions, users, reports, and some have
additional hardware. To augment them all and not force
redesign to existing systems is a difficult task. By the
time that SPLICE is ready to be implemented, there will
surely be more systems with which to interface.
Many of the new application requirements involve
interactive capabilities and telecommunications support.
This, in general, is not supportable with the current mix of
nardware and software.
The two advertised major objectives of SPLICE are: (1)
to allow for CRT display terminals to interact with
application logic and to fetch information from a system
data base; and, (2) to provide a standard interface for each
of the sixty-two supported supply sites. Notice that these
goals are stated in data processing rather than functional
terms
.
The implementation, in general, is envisioned as having
mini-computers used as front-ends to the existing hardware.
The interfaces with existing systems will be controlled by
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tne LAN. The Burroughs systems would be aole to provide
larger file processing functions and report generation
functions in a background mode. Each LAN is planned to be
"standardized," and have the capability to communicate with
other LANs via tne Defense Data Network (DDN), which is
managed by the Defense Communications Agency.
The functional objects which are contained in the
SPLICE network have been identified at a high level of
abstraction (Scnneidewind and Dolk, Nov 1983), and major
functions have been identified for those objects. It is the
purpose of this paper to decompose tne object called Session
Services into lower levels of abstraction, and to clarify
the functions at a level which should feed the design of the
actual module.
A session can be described as all of tne activity which
takes place among two or more processes for the duration of
a single task. The Session Services module is the object
which functions as the liaison between the user and required
functional modules. When the user specifies a required task,
the session services object will initiate and control the
required functional modules to accomplish tne requested
task, and return the response and the control to the user.
This control mechanism is a complex one, primarily due to
the following constraints:
o A user process may have multiple sessions active at
any time.
o A functional module can be active in multiple
sessions at a time.
8
o Two or more functional modules can be active in
multiple sessions at any time.
o Message exchange between pairs of functional
modules can be nested.
The multi -tasking requirements above are in addition to
message exchanges between local and remote sites, and tasKs
may be either deferrable or interactive.
This complex processing environment requires tnat a
module exist to control this activity. This role has been
delegated to the Session Services Module.
To more fully comprenend the role of Session Services
it may be helpful to examine the layers of control found in
a network architecture, of which Session Services is a
member
.
II. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE LEVELS
A fundamental goal of the SPLICE network arcmtecture
is to permit system designs that support geographic
distrioution of workstations which reflect the natural
partitioning (bacnman, 1978) of the Navy activities
involved. All application programs must be independent from
the physical topology of the nodes where tney reside. The
Session Services Layer supports this independence.
Workstation programs are written to request session
establishments among them using only logical addressing
names (mailboxes) whicn are independent from physical
topology. These requests are all sent to Session Services.
The session services module employs two principal mecnanisms
(Bachman, 1978) . The first mechanism is that it links
processes into temporary cooperative relat ionsnips by
locating the desired partner process via tne data
dictionary/directory system and activates that process in a
workstation after insuring that the partner is ready. An
approach for increasing the speed and reducing the overhead
by cutting hand shaking procedures to the bone is explained
in (Schneidewind and Dolk 1983). The second mechanism
employed is the exchange of data and status and control
information over established sessions. This synchronizes
cooperating processes, the databases they modify and the
journal entries of exchanged messages in support of data
integrity requirements. Security, resource management, and
system administration also have manifestations at the
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session service level, but have not been included as major
Session Services mechanisms.
Network architectures may vary with regard to
implementation structures but, in general, tne functions
provided are the same. The session services layer is usually
one of several layers of control identified witnin an
architecture. Using a logical architecture model closely
related to most commercially available arcni tectures is a
useful way of examining the entire control structure.
A layered approach to network architecture from the
International Standards Organization (ISO) defines seven
distinct layers of protocol. (Deitel, 1983)
Physical Layer - This layer handles the mecnanical and
electrical details of the actual physical
transmission of bit sequences over communication
lines
.
Data Link Layer - Tnis layer controls the manipulation
of data packets. It handles the addressing of
outgoing packets and the decoding of addresses on
incoming packets. It detects and possibly corrects
errors that occur in the Physical Layer.
Network Layer - This layer controls the switching
and routing of messages between stations in tne
network
.
Transport Layer - This layer provides for transfer of
messages between end users. The users need not be
concerned with the manner in which reliable and cost
effective data transfers are achieved.
Session Layer - This layer provides the means for
cooperating processes to organize and synchronize
their dialog and manage their data exchange.
Presentation Layer - This layer resolves differences in
formats among the various computers, terminals,
databases, and languages used in a network.
Application Layer - This layer is the highest layer and
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provides services directly to users. It deals with
data exactly as it is generated by and delivered to
user processes. This level contains the user-
specified functions and program controls.
The topology, media, and access procedures for the
eventual SPLICE system will not be addressed, as they are
implementation features. Instead, the emphasis will be placed
on design considerations which impact the system
requi rements
.
The next section will use hierarchical decomposition to




III. SESSION SERVICES FUNCTIONS
Each of the major functions will oe decomposed into
their logical pieces and described in more detail.
The first step is to describe the functions that are
within the scope of tne design. No attempt is made to
constrain this step by conforming to current organizational
structure or data processing systems in use. No attempt is
made to determine tne likelihood of automation. This
functional decomposition is not based on organizational
attributes, nor does the decomposition address control
issues at any level. Naming the business functions as
accurately and consistently as possible helps users relate
to the formalized function descriptions during the
requirements review. At each aggregate level of abstraction,
an attempt was made to maintain a similar level of detail
throughout that level. That is, the scope, size, magnitude,
and relative importance of each module should be
approximately equal at each level. During the process of
function definition, the next lower level of functionality
is described in an effort to validate tne level being
developed, and to insure the ability to make accurate
tradeoff decisions concerning cohesion and coupling issues
later. The function description consists of a unique
identifying number, the logical function name, a description
of the function, and its required input and output. When
validating functions with respect to system requirements, it
is useful to have a nierarchical chart of the functions
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available to cross-reference the function with its relative
position among the functions as a .vnole. The data flow
diagram is also a helpful tool to relate the flow of data
tnrough the different functions. Particularly confusing
ideas may also be cnarted in an effort to clarify tne
particular environment or requirement.
Tne following diagram snows the major logical













































Trie following descriptions are for high level
functions. Because eacn high level function is subsequently
oroKen into lower level functions, the descriptions will
only include a narrative describing the function performed.
Tne lower level functions will tnen oe described in more

















Establishes, monitors, and closes all sessions on
the system. It initiates and controls the required
controlling functional modules to accomplish the
requested task(s), and returns a response and/or
control to tne user via the TM module upon completion.






Translates a service request from the Terminal
Management Module (TM) to its required mapping of
functional modules to satisfy tne tasK named in tne
service request. The function also activates the
initial Controlling Functional Module (CFM) and sets
session status to indicate an active session, or





Maintains communication with, and passes control
to each CFM in accordance with the session map. This
function identifies additional data required for tne
user to complete a given task based on tne map of
functional modules. This function also makes any
changes to the functional module map, ana will verify





Updates session status to show result of Session
Complete Message, aids the system in maintaining
consistency in the session and/or system status during
interrupt processes, and aids the Recovery Module by
providing accurate session status information.
The following data flow diagram is an example of the
system activity that occurs at the highest level. The data
flow diagram is most useful to the reader as a verification
that the system is consistent and logical. It is sometimes










The next section describes the lowest level functions.
At tnis level, tne modules will nave suggested logical
inputs and outputs identified for later mapping to a low
level data flow diagram. Inputs and outputs have oeen
associated witn their respective sources (origins) ana
destinations (target). The sources and destinations are
SPLICE modules and CFMs. When either tne source or the
destination is a sub-module within the Session Services
Module it will be identified by the unique identifier of the
sub-module. To later complete the logical design for tne
specific SPLICE application, the input and output data must
be quantified. The expected level of activity will help to
size the system and provide necessary input to design
decisions concerning data base structure as well as module
determination
.

















NAME: DETERMINE MAP STRUCTURE
IDENTIFICATION: 1.1.1
JESCRIPTION: Tnis function determines tne correct map
structure based on tne tasK request and user or system
provided parameters. The map structure is a definition
of tne processes witnin a task and tneir relationships
to one another. Task requests may be ciirecceu to a
specific workstation mailbox by means of a unique
logical name. Tnis information is used to ent^r tne
data dictionary/directory system and retrieve the









NAME: REJECT SESSION REQUEST
IDENTIFICATION: 1.1.2
DESCRIPTION: Tnis function receives the exception status
from the DD/DS and sends an appropriate response to tne
originator via tne TM.
SOURCE/DESTINATION
INPUT: Task Rejection Data Dictionary Functional
Module
OUTPUT: Session Rejection Terminal Management Module
*******************************
NAME: INITIATE SESSION PROCESS
IDENTIFICATION: 1.1.3
DESCRIPTION: This function assigns a unique identifier to
the session, initiates a session-data entry whicn
includes tne map structure, a timestamp of initiation,
current controlling functional module, etc., flags the
controlling functional module as "active," and passes
control via a message to tne local or remote CFM. (Tne
National Communication Module will relay tnis message
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over tne DDN if it is destined for a remote CFM.







Local or demote CFM





































function interprets completion messages,
ocation(s), and/or parameters from active
Functional Modules (CFMs). It chec ks tne
nst the active map and identifies tne next
ivated. It removes the activation pointer
rent CFM and places it on tne next CFM to
by sending a message to tne CFM. If tne
completely traversed, then a com plet ion
the location of output text and/or
re sent to the Terminal Management Module
ical view of tne possible process state
are in Table 1 on page 21.) This module
s abnormal termination messages from CFMs
ault tolerant backup modules and r ep laces
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NAME: ALTER MAP STRUCTURE
IDENTIFICATION: 1.2.2
DESCRIPTION: Tins function is responsible for any alteration
made to toe functional map associated with a task. Data
can oe received from the active controlling functional
module, tne fault tolerant output verification modulo
(1.2. J) or the user. The data may consist of calls co
modules that are outside of tne normal map structure,
requests for additional information, or data uescrioing




INPUT :FM Call Validate Request CFM
User Message Terminal Management
OUTPUT: Map Alteration Message Traverse Map
Structure (1.2.1)
FM Call Validation Response CFM
******************************
NAME: VERIFY CFM OUTPUT
IDENTIFIER: 1.2. ->
DESCRIPTION: Tnis function ve
Functional Modules prior
from tne CFM. It compa
resulted from tne CFM aga
standard tuat nas been d
output will eitner match
passed because the module
output will not be consid
nas failed, wnen tne modu
data, tne name of tne lo
replacement is sent to
replacement module will b
rifles output from Controll ing
to control being transferred
res the output data thait nas
inst a prescribed valid out put
eveloped for the module i The
, meaning tnat control can be
arrived at valid data, or tne
ered valid, meaning tne module
le nas failed to provide va lid
gicai fault tolerant module
Alter Map Structure and tne
e executed.
SOURCE/DESTINATION
INPUT: CFM Output CFM
OUTPUT: Replacement Module Name Alter Map Structure
(1.2.2)
Message to User Terminal Management
Error Notification CFM
The decomposition that follows is for the Close Session
23
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NAME: TERMINATE SESSION PROCESS
IDENTIFIER: 1.3.1
DESCRIPTION: This function is responsible for completing tac
session-status data entry for a completed map
structure, and signifying the end of a session. Tne
"active" flags will oe removed from the last active
CFM, time stamped for termination, and an appropriate
message sent to the TM module indicating reason for
termination and location of any existing output.
SOURCE/DESTINATION








NAME: ASSIST INTERRUPT PROCESS
IDENTIFIER: 1.3.2
DESCRIPTION: Tnis function will resolve interrupts
originating when tne active controlling functional








OUTPUT: User Request: TM moaule
CFM Request CFM
*****************************
NAME: ASSIoT RECOVERY fkOCLSS
IDENTIFICATION: 1.3.3
DESCRIPTION: ».nis tunction aids the recovery Module (RM) oy
providing current status of all sessions upon request.
The restart anci/or recovery is concrolled entirely oy
tne RM module.
S^U RCE/ JEST 1 NAT I ON
INPUT: Status Request RM module
OUTPUT: Status Response RM module
The following cnart shows a summary of possible













Tne following data flow cnart is an example of tne
system activity tnat occurs at the lower level. It is useful
both as a different, pictorial view of tne interaction, and
25










1 V . SESSION S L K V I C £ S DATA
The next step is to define tne uata used witnin the
scope of tne system. At first/ this is done oy isolating chc
view to data only, ignoring any relationsnip to functions.
3ecause many misconcept ions about definitions of tcr:;s ma
/
exist anu .nay detract from the document's readability,
several significant terms associated witn the
interpretations of data used in this document are defineu
oeio^
:
DATA CLASS - a collection of data used to describe an
entity wnicn is easily describable, readily comprehend ibl=
and meaningful (witnin the system boundaries), past tne
point of just oeing a collection of data elements. Usually
they can be uniquely identified, and have unique data
elements associated with them. Basically, two types are
distinguishable: objects and concepts.
OBJECT - a particular occurrence of a data class which
exists, and is capaole of oeing sensed.
CONCEPT - an effort or action in tne real world. An
example of some typical concepts might make tne distinction
clearer. A "bani; account" may well be a concept data class,
it is uniquely defined by an account numoer, has meaning
witnin tne oanking industry, yet you cannot toucn it. it
exists merely as an agreement oetween the customer and the
bank. It can be represented or referred to .atn listings of
account status, or inquiry, but cannot oe seen or sensed.
INDICATIVE KEY - the attribute which enaoles an object
or concept witnin a data class to be uniquely identifiea. An
indicative key points to one and only one occurrence of a
data class.
XREF KEY - an attribute used to show a relationsnip of
one data class to another data class. Tne physical
implementation may appear as a link record or pointer.
Each data class is described in a form consisting of a
data description, i<ey elements, and relationships to other
2 7
data classes. Selection of the data class name snould oe
consistent with tne usage within tne system Deing modelea.
That is, the users of tne system snould not oe forced to
ciiange their normal vocabulary. The iaen 1 1 f ica 1 1 on of the
keys are nelpful later in the development of the optimum
data s tr uc ture
.
The definition of raw data for the system is completed
when this step is completed. Furtner refinements and




NAME: SESSION - Describes the time frame that represents a
user requesting a task from the SPLICE system and
receiving a response to tne request. Tne
oeginning is marked by tne Session Services
Module after it nas received clearance for a
particular user for a particular functional
module. Tne end is marked by the Session Services
Module when an error has forced an abend status
or tne functional map nas oeen completed, and
control is returned to the user via the Terminal
Management Module.
ELEMENTS:




Current Controlling Functional Modules
User Identifier (XREF to User)
Terminal Identifier (XREF to Mailbox)
Service Request Code (XREF to Task )






NAME: CASK - Joscrioes eacn joe tnat :;i: SPLICL system
aliows tne user to request from any work station
in tne system. It may re la to to a single
Functional Module, call^u a Controlling
cunccional Moaule, or it may oe a napping of
several modules containing a Controlling
ELEMENTS :-
Service Request Coce (Indicative Key)
User Authority Required





NAME: MAILBOX - A method of uniquely identifying
repositories of data from deferred tasks. It also
identifies tne nature of tne service requestec
for those users with multiple mailboxes.
ELEMENTS:
Mailbox Number (Indicative key)
Command Location






NAME: USER - A person or group of persons wno are








Terminal Restrictions (XREF to Mailbox)
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V. y.APPlNG OF DATA TO FUNCTIONS
Tne logical design, based on function and data was
presented in the previous section. t'ucure wocr; in this area
will involve mapping tne data to the functions, tnat is, we
will determine which functions use which uata.
The data are categorized with respect to the role tney
play for tnat function as well. Data can be a trigger that
causes the function to occur; it can be input from anotner
function, or outside source; it can be input from the data
repository; it can be an output whicn triggers another
function; it can be output to a data repository; or it can
be output to anotner function or outside destination.
After data nave been mapped to the individual
functions, a determination is made of what transformations
occur in tne system is made. A transformation is an action
tnat changes tne input data and creates or helps to create
an output. Using input/output data defined in the function
description, values for the quantities of each particular
input and output can De used to determine tne numbers of
occurrences of these transactions. The quantities may
adaress data class aostractions ; therefore, the data
dictionary may have to be used to cross reference data
elements tnat are at tne particular level identified in tne
transformations
.
This information can be used to grapn the number of
occurrences of transforms and relate this information to tne
required data relationships. Using this grapn, the
3ti
transf ormations that most frequently occur within the system
jrc ij_ncuiju. This grapn can tnen be used to decide wnich
Logical data relationships to implement.
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VI. SESSION SERVICES INTERFACES
The Session Services Module has no interface external
to the SPLICE system. The user and other systems only access
the session services module via other SPLICE modules. There
are major interfaces which must be defined within the SPLICE
system. The following interfaces are addressed on a logical
basis without identifying the actual implementation details:
SESSION SERVICES TO TERMINAL MANAGEMENT MODULE
Rather than communicate directly with user terminals,
the functionality is separated between Session Services and
Terminal Management. The end user always communicates with
the Terminal Management Module and the Terminal Management
Module always communicates with Session Services or the
user. The TM sends session requests from a particular
mailbox or interactive user to Session Services. The TM
receives the completion message, tne output location, the
rejection message, and the information request message from
session services. The TM will provide all necessary message
editing, screen management and virtual terminal operating
functions
.
SESSION SERVICES TO RECOVERY MODULE
Session Services is a support module to the Recovery
Module. When tne Recovery Module requires data concerning
the current or recoverable state of all or any session, the
request will be addressed to Session Services. Session
Services will access the required data and forward them to
the Recovery Module. No recovery logic is contained in tne
Session Services Module.
SESSION SERVICES TO DATA DICTIONARY/DIRECTORY
When Session Services requires data concerning user
authority, task security level, task mapping structures,
data structures, or functional module relationships, it will
request that data from the Data Dictionary/Directory.
SESSION SERVICES TO NATIONAL COMMUNICATION MODULE
During a session, the control is passed to the
Controlling Functional Modules via the logical bus
mechanism. If the logical name refers to a remote module
then it is picked up by the National Communication Module
(NC) and initiated for transmission on the DDN. The NC
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Module will convert LAN protocol to Defense Data Network
protocol and vice versa, enabling session services to rely
only on the local LAN protocol.
SESSION SERVICES TO LOCAL COMMUNICATION MODULE
During a session, control is passed to the Controlling
Functional Module via the logical bus mechanism. If the
logical name relates to a module contained in the LAN, then
it is picked up by the Local Communication Module and
ini t iated .
SESSION SERVICES TO SESSION STATE DATA
Session Services is the only module able to access
session state data. Tne Session Services Module will
maintain state information in its own file. These data
should be structured so that no other module may access
them, and more critically, alter them.
SESSION SERVICES TO FUNCTIONAL MODULES
There is no interface between Session Services and
functional modules, other than a Controlling Functional
Module. All called functional modules interface solely with
the CFM.
In general the interfaces do not require any additional
information to be added to the LAN message format presented
in (Schneidewind , 1982). The data that are contained in the























Our major design recommendation concerns the
implementation of fault tolerant techniques, which is
covered in some detail because of the general lack of
awareness concerning fault tolerant methods. The other
recommendations address possible problem areas related to
tne nature of the application environment.
A. FAULT TOLERANCE
The notion of incorporating a means for tolerating
faults in order to improve computer system reliability is
well established. Because of the usual multiple meanings
of data processing terms, we will attempt to define several
terms. Fault tolerance is a term describing a system capable
of coping with faults without a requirement for manual
intervention. Fault prevention, a similar concept, avoids
potential faults by detecting and eliminating them prior to
operating the system. Once the system is operational, fault
tolerance, if it exists, begins. The SPLICE session services
module should employ fault tolerance to improve reliability.
For a system to be fault tolerant, it must be able to:
detect errors, assess and confine the damage, and repair or
recover from the error without forcing manual intervention.
Detection methods are most abundant. Assessing, confining,
and recovering methods are not well defined nor readily
avai lable
.
Unmastered complexity at any level increases the
possibility of a fault occurring. It is highly unlikely that
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the SPLICE system will ever be fault free. A major part of
the complexity in SPLICE will be implemented in software.
Therefore, software developers should seek not to design
"perfect, error free" software, but rather attempt to
provide reliable fault tolerant techniques for SPLICE in all
modules
.
Any definition of tne reliability of a system must
involve distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable
benavior of the system. There must be some method to
distinguish between unsatisfactory behavior which is a
consequence of user misunderstanding and unacceptable
behavior due to deficiencies in the system itself. The
system specification should provide that mechanism.
Ideally, a specification should be consistent,
authoritative and so complete that the behavior of the
system is defined for all possible input and output
sequences. In each circumstance where this is not so,
acceptable behavior cannot be distinguished from
unacceptable behavior. Regardless of the specification, only
two concepts are essential to understand the causes of
failure: (1) an event (state) which should not have occurred
and (2) a condition (state) which should not have arisen.
Internally, these are usually referred to as erroneous
transitions and erroneous states. If either of these
internal situations exists, then it follows that the system
has had a component or design failure.
36
"An erroneous transition of a system is an internal state
transition to which subsequent failure could be attributed.
Specifically, there must exist a possible sequence of
interactions which would, in the absence of corrective
action from the system, lead to a system failure
attributable to the erroneous transition."
"An erroneous state of a system is an internal state
which could lead to a failure by a sequence of valid
transitions. Specifically, there must exist a possible
sequence of interactions which would, in the absence of
corrective action by the system and in the absence of
erroneous transitions lead from the erroneous state to a
system failure." (Anderson and Lee, 1983)
Design faults are unpredictable and unexpected.
Unanticipated errors are the result. Experience from
previous, identical or similar faults is usually not
helpful in resolving tne design fault.
If these ideas are acceptable, then it is not difficult
to determine why a major portion of the effort in fault
tolerance has been aimed at component failure to date. To
illustrate the point, make this trivial comparison of an
easy component failure and an easy design failure:
COMPONENT - A diode fails, causing an open circuit.
It was predictable since diodes only last so many
hours in certain environments. The result of a
continually open circuit is predictable and can be
anticipated. It is repaired in the same manner as
tne last diode failure.
DESIGN - A logic circuit fails to produce the desired
results. The desired results are to exchange the




Ai : = A
j
Aj : = Ai
An obvious design failure causes the value Ai to be
lost.
To correct the algorithm the following adjustment may
be made:
Ai : = Ai - A
j
A j : = A j + Ai
Ai := A] - Ai
The problem did not go away; it just changed and became
more difficult to find. Now, it works for most cases;
however, this algorithm will fail when i = j. The resultant
error may not always be the same. The repair of the error
may require different procedures for each error, therefore,
the experience of past identical or similar failures may not
be useful.
Techniques such as top down development, structured
programming, step-wise refinement, and information hiding
all embrace the principle of divide and (nope to) conquer.
Some of the problems of software-oriented fault
tolerance are unique to the errors found in software design.
There have been two methods suggested for providing software
with fault tolerant characteristics which address those
unique qualities which make software fault tolerance so
difficult. The methods are called: "Recovery block scheme",
and "N-version programming". Both operate under the
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assumption that, despite tne use of fault prevention
techniques, any complex software system will always contain
residual faults when placed in service.
Tne recovery block scheme was designed as a method to
provide fault tolerant capabilities to sequential programs.
The application module is called the primary module and is
defined as a non-redundant software module which has been
designed and implemented to satisfy the authorizing
speci f icat ion
.
The first stage of the process is to detect when an
error arises during the execution of the "primary module."
Since the primary module has been debugged and tested as
much as practicable, the module may run several times
without any error conditions. There are advantages and
disadvantages to placing an error detector within the code
itself. The error detection module should be separate and
executed immediately after the execution of the "primary
module," before any data are transferred and used in a
subsequent module. This "acceptance test" consists of a
sequence of statements which will raise an exception if the
state of the system is not acceptable. The primary module
will have failed if any exception is raised.
The second stage is to assess the damage and repair or
recover. This function will require a recovery point
mechanism to prevent rerun of entire modules or groups of
modules. Therefore, at the beginning of each primary module,
tnere will be a sequence of statements, or some method of
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indicating the status of the machine environment. Various
methods are in wide use today and may be applied. When the
error occurs and is detected by the "acceptance test," there
must be an available alternate module to process. If we were
to recover and repeat the primary module under the same
conditions, we would expect the error to recur and we would
have an endless cycle of execution. The alternate modules
are logically capable of producing the required output as
defined by the "acceptance test." They may be less
efficient with respect to memory and/or speed, however, or
be designed in a less complicated fashion. Regardless of
their weaknesses, their strength is that they have less
probability of design error. Perhaps several alternate
modules are developed, each less complicated than the
previous. This alternate module is, in fact, built-in
redundancy and reflects the degree of reliability required
of the system. The alternate modules are invoked only if an
error occurs, thus minimizing the overhead. Software
monitors can be used to record activation occurrences of
these alternate modules. Run time overhead is incurred for
each recovery point established and for each call to the
acceptance test module. The recovery block logic appears as:
ESTABLISH RECOVERY POINT
EXECUTE PRIMARY MODULE
APPLY ACCEPTANCE TEST TO RESULT
INVOKE ALTERNATE MODULE IF FAILURE EXISTS
APPLY ACCEPTANCE TEST TO RESULT
INVOKE ALTERNATE MODULE IF FAILURE EXISTS
The usual syntax associated with the scheme is:
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ENSURE (acceptance test criteria>
BY (primary module name)
ELSE BY (alternate module #1>
ELSE BY (alternate module #2>
ELSE ERROR
Tnese blocks can be nested and do not impose
constraints on the programming style or the methodology
being used. They are compatible witn structured programming
techniques and high level languages.
In a sort application, the fault tolerant recovery
block might appear as:
ENSURE A[j+1] >= A[j] for j=l,2,. . .n-1
BY Sort A using quicksort
ELSE BY Sort A using shell sort
ELSE BY Sort A using insertion sort
ELSE ERROR
Where quicksort is a time-efficient, slick, compactly-
coded module; shell sort is less efficient, but easier to
visualize and less prone to design error; and insertion sort
is a simple brute-force type of sort routine.
Fail soft approaches also use this technique by having
each alternate module provide some reduced service or a
subset of the required output. The following is an example
of a disk-to-memory transfer function which is being
gracefully degraded:
ENSURE consistency of disk transfer queue
BY enter request in optimal queue position
ELSE BY enter request at end of each queue
ELSE BY send warning message x request ignored'
ELSE ERROR
While the above example may cause problems for the
program requesting the transfer, tne rest of the system can
proceed without disruption.
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Control flow of the recovery process can be directly
supported by microcode, or by the use of special purpose
instructions which are tailored to suit recovery block
schemes. The Anderson and Kerr report describes an
experimental architecture which provides this support in a
recovery cache mechanism.
So far, it has been assumed that exceptions occurring
during the execution of a recovery block program will result
in backward error recovery and a transfer of control to the
next alternate module.
There is, however, nothing to prevent a forward error
recovery technique within a module of a recovery block. An
application of this concept might be used in the detection
of an underflow occurrence. An error handler could insert
the lowest value number used in the machine and continue to
process; then flag the result with a note to the user that
the substitution was made. In this case, it is more
efficient than finding a recovery point and running an
alternate module. Other situations exist which favor forward
error recovery as well.
Tne recovery block scheme is conceptually simple. Tne
implementation may not be as simple. Alternate modules
require extra coding and require more complicated module
interfaces. This added complexity has not been quantifiable
to date. This is true because of the lack of total testing
results and the lack of use in multiple application areas.
Because alternate modules are independent of one another,
42
the implementation of multiple alternate modules is not much
more difficult than just one alternate module, if previous
modules exist. This could be very expensive if all modules
were developed from scratcn; therefore, a good source of
alternate modules is found in the prior versions of a
module. For example, as updated replacement modules (with
optimized features, or refined functions) are ready to be
implemented, the previous module may be used as the first
alternate.
The acceptance test procedure adds a dimension of
complexity that is not present in non-fault tolerant
systems, although, for every set of alternate and primary
modules, this acceptance test need only be designed and
implemented once. In the SPLICE application, this module
should not be unacceptably large or complex. It should be
noted that SPLICE will use a Tandem Computer system whicn is
designed to provide redundant hardware and software modules
for all major functions.
The second method for implementing software fault
toleration is conceptually simpler. The N-Version approach
to fault tolerance has N versions, where N is greater than
1, of independently designed code which satisfies a single
specification. All the versions are executed and all the
results are compared. The correct (majority) response is
sent to its destination while the erroneous responses, if
they exist, are ignored.
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The implementation of the scheme requires a driver
program to invoke eacn version, collect each response,
compare the results, and determine the correct response.
Lach version operates atomically and uses the same input
space, so the driver must synchronize the execution of
versions. The originators of this approach, (Chen and
Avizienis, 1981), use a handshake method with "wait" and
"send" primitives to insure that only one version at a time
is running. This scheme prevents realizing the advantages of
pipelining, or parallel processing. It also requires a
timeout detection capability to prevent infinite loops.
An advantage of the N-version technique is that damage
assessment would not have to be done at all, and error
recovery is done by simply ignoring the erroneous answer. An
obvious disadvantage on the other hand is the overhead of
atomically executing each version with the same input space,
and executing a voting check to obtain a single result.
There are few, if any, theoretical reasons for not
adopting fault tolerance techniques. It seems that the real
factors preventing widespread acceptance are:
o Education : Lack of courses, books, and quantifiable
evidence of improved reliability, make it a
difficult idea to sell to managers.
o Psychological : Adopting these schemes is, in some
way, admitting the existence of design faults.
Therefore, the designers and programmers do not
have motivation to persuade the managers.
o Cost : It is perceived, by project managers, as an
additional cost without additional functionality.
Without the necessary motivation, they are unable
or unwilling to justify the development or
runtime overhead involved.
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Since a great deal of money will be spent on SPLICE
software (development and maintenance) , producing fault
tolerant software may be the most advantageous approach from
a systems life cycle cost perspective. Again, we note that
hardware fault tolerance is provided by the SPLICE Tandem
system. However, this feature is of little help, if there
are errors in applications software.
B. Jeopardizing Coupling and Cohesion Principles
A designer should not attempt to excessively enlarge
functional modules in an effort to reduce overhead. This
must be a carefully considered option. If multiple functions
are combined or extra data are passed to prevent another
call, then the modular characteristics begin to deteriorate.
This may result in a very expensive and time consuming
maintenance portion of the life cycle. Controlling
functional modules should be capable of coordinating an
entire transaction. For a single controlling module to
coordinate an entire transaction, it is required that it
contain all logic necessary to perform that transaction.
System designs which dictate that coded modules be as
cohesive as practical and that coupling interfaces be kept
simple, are usually easier to maintain. It is far better,
at least in the design phase, to split out functions in the
widest pattern. More breadth in design eases the task of
maintaining coupling and cohesion principles, while not
adversely impacting the implementation. If, for example,
after sizing the transactions, it appears that control
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cannot be achieved efficiently, it is possible to
systematically combine the modules witn the least negative
impact and the most benefit.
C. Use of ADA Program Unit Specifications
The use of ADA as a program design language would serve
to enhance the SPLICE software design process. The use of
ADA program unit specifications during design can be
implemented in either ADA or Pascal easily. Additionally,
this systematic approach, will allow this design to
interface more easily with future DOD supported projects in
the logistics environment. The ADA Program Support
Environment (APSE) could have a long learning period
associated with it. To begin using it now would improve
FMSO's long term position with respect to the Navy's support
of DOD policy and, at the same time, provide a good
environment in which to learn it with relatively low risk.
APSE would provide configuration control of the functional
allocation of each program unit.
D. Naming of Modules
The naming of unique modules will be difficult to
achieve because of the widespread adoption of local unique
programs at each of the stock points. Many stock points have
personalized the reorder process, the inventory process, and
many management reports. In some stock points, local unique
programs form the basis of the MIS used, instead of the FMSO
provided UADPS-SP. Local programs may nave the same names
as modules at another stock point; they may also have the
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same name and function as a module from UADPS-SP. Because
most stock points believe they have unique requirements or
because the wait to get requested UADPS-SP ennancements is
excessively long, they have created a number of local-unique
programs that enhance UADPS-SP or in some cases replace it.
Transaction Item Reporting (TIR) notices from the stock
point to the ICPs for ICP-control led items is largely done
with stock point local-unique programs.
This is a critical problem to solve before the design
of Session Services or any other module goes too far. If the
local unique programs cannot be standardized for all stocx
points, or cannot be placed in a global library with unique
names and parameters identified, the entire level of control
and ability to share data and processes envisioned by SPLICE
proponents is at risk.
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VII . SUMMARY
The Session Services Module should contain functions as
described in section III with the the data described in
section IV as a support structure. The interfaces described
in section VI must be kept in mind during the detail design
phase of the project. The major design recommendation offered
in this paper is the fault tolerant concept. Design
recommendations to prevent large modules which hinder the
coupling and cohesion characteristics of modules and the use
of ADA program unit specifications are mentioned because the
SPLICE environment may be well served by their use. The
recommendation to standardize the local unique program names
is discussed in an effort to prevent the serious situation
that would result if this aspect of the SPLICE project were
ignored. The stock points which will be served by this
system have a long history of addressing local requirements
with locally designed and developed software whicn
interfaces with FMSO-provided software. All of the stock
point requirements must be examined carefully and a decision
that is mutually agreeable between designers and users must
be made concerning what parts are to be standard and
unmodified, and which parts are to be changed by local
adaptations. The eventual use or misuse of the system could
be determined by this decision.
48
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Constructing User Interface Based on Logical Input
Devices," Computer , pp. 62-68, November, 1982
"Heuristic Models of Task Assignment Scheduling in
Distributed Systems," Computer , pp. 50-56, June, 1392
Davies, L.W., Computer Networks c nd Thei r Protocols , Jonn
Wiley and Sons, 1979
Jacobsen, Tom, et. al., "Virtual Terminal Protocols
Transport Service and Session Control", Computer
Cummunication Review , ACM, Vol. 10, No. 1 and 7, pp 24-40,
January/April 1980.
Loomis, Mary E.S., Data Communications , Prentice-Hall, 1983.
Pooch, Udo W., Greene, William H., and Moss, Gary
G., Telecommunications and Networking , Little, Brown and
Company, 1983.
Shoch, J.F., "Internetwork Naming, Addressing and Routing",
Proceedings of COMPCON Fall 78, IEEE Computer Society,
pp. 72-79.
Sultzer, Jerome H., "On the Naming and Binding of Network
Destinations Local Computer Networks," Ravasco, Piercarlo,
et. al. (eds.), North-Halland Publishing Co., pp. 311-317,
1982.




Anderson, T. and Kerr, R. , "Recovery Blocks in Action: A
System Supporting High Reliability," Proceedings of 2nd
International Conference on Software Engineering, San
Francisco (CA) , pp. 447-457, October 1976.
Anderson, T. and Lee, P. A. , Fault Tolerance Pr inciples and
Practice , Prentice Hall, 1981.
Avizienis, Algirdas, "Fault Tolerant Computing: An
Overview", Computer
, pp. 5-8, Jan/Feb 1971.
Bachman, Charles and Canepa, Mike, "The Session Control
Layer of an Open System Interconnection", Proceedings,
Computer Communications Networks, COMPCON, pp 150-156,
September 1978.
Deitel, H.M., An Introduction to Operating Systems
,
Addison-Wesley, 1983.
Schneidewind , Norman F., "Functional Design of a Local Area
Network for the Stock Point Logistics Integrated
Communications Environment", Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, December 1982.
Schneidewind, Norman F., "Functional Approach to the Design
of a Local Network: A Naval Logistics System Example",
Digest of Papers, Spring COMPCON 83 pp. 197-202.
Schneidewind, Norman F., and Dolk, Daniel R., "A Distributed
Operating System Design and Dictionary/Directory for the
Stock Point Logistics Integrated Communications
































LCDR Ron Nichols 1
Code 94L
Fleet Material Support Office
Mechan icsburg , PA 17055
LCDR Ted Case 1
Code 94L
Fleet Material Support Office
Mechanicsburg , PA 17055
Commander Dana Fuller 1
Code 0415A








c «2 A logical design of a
session services con-




A logical design of a session service co
3 2768 001 90037 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY C' ft
